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Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits
of Everyday Confabulation
Lisa Bortolotti1
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Abstract In this paper I discuss the costs and benefits of confabulation, focusing
on the type of confabulation people engage in when they offer explanations for
their attitudes and choices. What makes confabulation costly? In the philosophical
literature confabulation is thought to undermine claims to self-knowledge. I argue
that when people confabulate they do not necessarily fail at mental-state self-
attributions, but offer ill-grounded explanations which often lead to the adoption
of other ill-grounded beliefs. What, if anything, makes confabulation beneficial?
As people are unaware of the information that would make their explanations
accurate, they are not typically in a position to acknowledge their ignorance or
provide better-grounded explanations for their attitudes and choices. In such cases,
confabulating can have some advantages over offering no explanation because it
makes a distinctive contribution to people’s sense of themselves as competent and
largely coherent agents. This role of ill-grounded explanations could not be as
easily played by better-grounded explanations should these be available. In the
end, I speculate about the implications of this conclusion for attempting to
eliminate or reduce confabulation.
1 Introduction
There are several forms of behaviour that are described as instances of con-
fabulation in the empirical literature. ‘Confabulation’ comes from the Latin
fabula, which means ‘story’. A story can be a faithful representation of reality
that aims at accuracy, such as a historical account; or a piece of fiction that
does not aim at accuracy, such as a fairy-tale. People confabulate when they
tell a story that is not backed up by the relevant evidence, although they
genuinely regard it as a true story. Thus, in terms of its relationship with
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evidence, the story has the same status as a piece of fiction, but in terms of
people’s intentions in telling the story, it is offered as a faithful representation
of reality. Indeed, people do not intentionally confabulate. If they report some-
thing that they know to be untrue or ill-grounded, then they do not confabulate,
but engage in a form of lying or deceit.
In this paper, I am interested in the ill-grounded explanations people offer
for their attitudes and choices when they are not aware of some of the key
factors causally responsible for their behaviour. In the philosophical literature
the costs of this form of confabulation have been discussed at length. In
particular, confabulation is construed as a challenge to mental-state self-ascrip-
tions and first-person authority (e.g., Carruthers 2005; Lawlor 2003; Scaife
2014). The benefits of confabulation have not been investigated in detail in
the philosophical literature (but see Bortolotti and Cox 2009; Strijbos and de
Bruin 2015; Coltheart 2017) and, in particular, it has not been asked whether
confabulation can have epistemic benefits. This leaves us with a potentially
one-sided view of the epistemic status of confabulation.
Here I propose a new account of what is epistemically problematic about
confabulation and make room for the view that confabulation has psychological
and epistemic benefits that deserve careful consideration. These are not benefits
that agents intend to gain by confabulating, but aspects of confabulation that
make a positive epistemic contribution independent of the agent’s intentions. In
Sections 2, 3, and 4, I introduce and articulate the notion of confabulation. My
main focus is the phenomenon of offering ill-grounded explanations for every-
day choices, but the same features of confabulation I identify in that context
can also be found in explanations of moral judgements and hiring decisions.
My thesis is that confabulation is a type of ill-grounded explanation for
attitudes and choices that is offered when the causal processes responsible for
such attitudes and choices are opaque to introspection or otherwise difficult to
access.
In Sections 5, 6 and 7, I turn to the costs and benefits of confabulation.
Confabulation does not necessarily involve a breakdown of self-knowledge. People
who confabulate know what their attitudes and choices are, but do not have access to
key information about the formation of those attitudes and choices. When they provide
an ill-grounded explanation rather than acknowledging ignorance, they often end up
adopting further ill-grounded beliefs. This represents a significant epistemic cost.
However, confabulating may support people’s sense of themselves as competent and
largely coherent agents to a greater extent than acknowledging ignorance or offering
better-grounded explanations for attitudes and choices, and it can also have some
epistemic benefits. Psychological evidence suggests that, when people develop a sense
of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents, then they interact with their
environment in a way that is more conducive to the acquisition, retention, and use of
relevant information, and they become more efficacious and resilient at pursuing their
goals, including their epistemic goals.
In Section 8, I consider some objections to the thesis that confabulation has
epistemic benefits, and I reflect on some implications of my view for interventions
aimed at reducing confabulation, both in social exchanges and in personal reflections
about attitudes and choices.
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2 What is Confabulation?
Clinically, confabulation is a symptom of neuropsychological disorders featuring mem-
ory impairments. Henry, who has memory impairments due to frontal damage, reports
correctly that he is married and that he has four children. When he is asked how long he
has been married, he replies incorrectly B4 months^, instead of 30 years (primary
confabulation). When he is asked how it is that he has four children after only 4 months
of marriage, he claims that his children were adopted, even though they are in fact his
natural children (secondary confabulation).1 In the former instance, Henry makes an
inaccurate claim about his past; in the latter instance, Henry makes a further inaccurate
claim in order to defend his initial report from a challenge. There is no reliable
autobiographical information on which Henry can base his answers given his memory
impairment. Henry distorts reality in significant ways (his four children were not
adopted), but his answers to the questioning are sincere and they are not offered with
the intention to deceive. Henry reports what he believes to be the case, filling the gaps in
the knowledge of his past with hypotheses that are plausible given what he knows.
Non-clinical confabulation captures a much more widespread phenomenon which is
defined in terms of the epistemic features of the claims that people produce.
Researchers do not agree about which epistemic costs are shared by different instances
of confabulation (Bortolotti and Cox 2009). According to some influential proposals,
confabulation involves inaccurate narratives or false beliefs that are also resistant to
counter-evidence (Berrios 2000, page 348; Turnbull et al. 2004, page 6). Such pro-
posals make inaccuracy or falsehood necessary for confabulation. Alternative accounts
identify the main cost of confabulation with producing narratives or adopting beliefs
that are not based on the relevant evidence. For instance, confabulation has been
defined as an ill-grounded claim people make when they do not realise that their claim
is ill-grounded (Hirsten 2005), or an unsubstantiated claim people make in response to
a question that they cannot answer because the relevant information is not known or
accessible to them (Turner and Coltheart 2010).
The definitions of confabulation based on ill-groundedness or lack of evidential
support are preferable to those based on inaccuracy or falsehood, as someone lacking
access to the relevant evidence may still produce an accurate narrative or a true claim by
accident, without relying on the evidence supporting the claim. That said, most cases of
confabulation, including those I will discuss in this paper, do result in inaccurate
narratives or false claims.
3 Confabulating about Consumer Choice
People often confabulate when they are asked about their attitudes or choices.
When a person does not know or does not have access to the answer to a question
addressed to that person (typically the question may be a request for explanation
of why the person behaved in a certain way, or else a question asking why the
person holds a particular belief), but when asked the question responds by
1 This example is inspired by a real-life case discussed by Moscovitch (1995).
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offering an answer to it rather than saying ‘I don’t know’, and if this is done with
no intention to deceive the questioner, then that response counts as confabulation
(Coltheart and Turner 2009, page 180).
In their now classic study, Richard Nisbett and Tim Wilson wanted to investigate the
extent to which people are aware of their mental processes when they are asked to give
reasons for their choices (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Research participants were asked
to choose some items as part of a consumer survey. Some participants were asked to
choose between four nightgowns which were different from one another. Other partic-
ipants were asked to choose between four pairs of nylon stockings which were
identical. Then, all participants were asked why they made their choices. The experi-
menters found that participants’ choices were very heavily influenced by the position of
the items, and the item that was most on their right was the one they systematically
preferred.2 But when people offered reasons for their choices, they did not mention the
position of the chosen items as a factor determining or influencing their choices. Rather,
they mentioned features of the items, such as softness or colour, even when the items
they chose from differed only in their position.
What happens in the Nisbett and Wilson study? There is some controversy about the
best interpretation of the study.3 The authors argue that, when participants are asked to
explain their choices, they have no access to the mental processes responsible for their
choices because such processes are characterised by priming effects that are opaque to
introspection. Instead, participants provide an explanation that is plausible given their
background beliefs about what makes items such as nightgowns or stockings prefera-
ble. As a result, their explanations are not grounded on the evidence relevant to the
processes responsible for their making those particular choices.
Imagine that three research participants are asked, BWhy did you choose this pair of
nylon stockings?^ just after they have chosen one pair out of four identical pairs. Also
imagine that they all claim that they chose that pair because it was the most brightly
coloured, but they arrive at their answers differently. Are their claims an instance of
confabulation? What is wrong with their claims?
Sylvia chooses the rightmost pair of stockings because she believes that it is the
brightest. She explains that she chose it because it is the brightest. The explanation she
offers for her choice is accurate, although her belief about the chosen pair of stockings
being the brightest is false. In this first scenario, Sylvia does not engage in confabu-
lation, because she offers an explanation for her choice that is well-grounded. But her
choice is based on a false belief.
Roberto chooses the rightmost pair of stockings because of position effects. When
asked to explain his choice, he answers that he chose that pair because it was the
brightest. As Roberto does not mention the role of position effects in his choice, his
explanation is ill-grounded. In this case, Roberto confabulates. Not only does he offer
2 In-depth analyses of this study are provided in Hirsten (2005) and Carruthers (2005), and more recently
Strijbos and de Bruin (2015), Milhailov (2016) and Coltheart (2017).
3 In a recent paper, Newell and Shanks (2014) argue against the standard interpretation of the Nisbett and
Wilson study, hypothesising that research participants’ choices were not determined by the position of the
items. I do not believe the new interpretation would make the present discussion outdated or irrelevant, as one
could agree with Newell and Shanks about what process is responsible for bringing about the participants’
choices, and yet consider the results of the Nisbett and Wilson study as evidence for confabulation.
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an ill-grounded explanation, but, as a result of confabulating, he also forms the belief
that the pair of stockings he chose is the brightest, and that belief is false. In this second
scenario, we find the interpretation of the experimental results defended by Nisbett and
Wilson. Participants who are asked for an explanation of their choices produce an ill-
grounded causal claim due to their ignorance of the mental processes underlying their
choices.
Swati chooses the rightmost pair of stockings because of position effects. She
interprets the experimenter’s question about her choice as a request for a justification.
Presumably, there is no good reason for Swati’s choice as the stockings to choose from
were identical (unless we believe that we are in a situation in which the position of an
item is a good reason to choose it). When asked to justify her choice, Swati says that the
pair of stockings she chose is the brightest. Her justification latches onto generally
plausible reasons for choosing stockings and other similar items. However, as a
justification for her particular choice of the rightmost pair of stockings within a set of
four identical pairs of stockings, her answer is epistemically problematic. In this third
scenario, Swati’s answer is not supposed to disclose the causal processes leading to her
choice, but to highlight what good reasons there are for that choice, whether or not
those reasons did motivate her in making the choice (Sandis 2015). The problem is that
the reason she mentions as a justifying reason for her particular choice does not match
the features of the situation.
Independent of the interpretation of the experimental results which we favour, there
are significant epistemic faults in what people say about their choices. In Sylvia’s case,
we have a well-grounded and accurate explanation based on a false belief. Sylvia gets
the world wrong (the chosen pair of stocking is not the brightest), but she accurately
identifies the reasons for her choice. In Roberto’s case, we have a case of confabulation
resulting in the adoption of a false belief, that the chosen stockings are the brightest.
Roberto is not aware of the factors determining or influencing his choice and he
provides an ill-grounded and inaccurate explanation for his choice. In Swati’s case,
she interprets the task as a request for justification and thus she does not even attempt to
identify the causal processes leading up to her original choice. The justification Swati
offers for her choice is epistemically problematic and, in searching for a justification,
she ends up adopting a false belief, that the chosen stockings are the brightest.
The possibility that the cases of Sylvia and Swati illustrate what occurs some of the
time when people are asked for reasons should not be ruled out. In the Nisbett and
Wilson study, for instance, it is possible that position effects generate a perceptual
salience which manifests as brightness for some participants and as softness for other
participants. This may give rise to the situation described in Sylvia’s case. Also, it is
possible that people interpret the question BWhy did you choose this pair of stockings?^
as a request for justification rather than as a request for explanation, due to the question
being ambiguous. That said, with Nisbett and Wilson, I will assume here that the most
plausible interpretation of the behaviour of the participants in the study is that they offer
an ill-grounded explanation as in Roberto’s case.
Some of my considerations in the rest of the paper, however, can also apply to
different interpretations of the way in which people account for their attitudes and
choices. Notice that Sylvia explains her choice as based on a belief that she indeed has,
the belief that the item most on the right is the brightest, but she may not realise that her
belief is influenced by priming effects and that the belief could be different if the
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position of the item changed. So, the concerns one might have about the explanation in
Roberto’s case, that it may indicate a limitation in people’s knowledge about how their
attitudes are formed or their choices are made, may apply to Sylvia’s initial belief too.
Similarly, it is true that explaining and justifying are distinct enterprises with different
success conditions, but in rational decision making the reasons that motivate people to
make a choice should at least partially reflect what people take to be good reasons for
that choice. The reasons the participants offered for their choices are not likely to be
either motivating reasons for those choices or suitable reasons in support of those
particular choices. Which means that in Swati’s case just as in Roberto’s case some
epistemic failure is at play.
One interesting feature about the Nisbett and Wilson study is that the participants’
story about why they made their choices rings more true than the accurate explanation
of their behaviour, especially on the background of the assumption that, generally,
humans are rational agents and competent decision makers. Why should people be
influenced by the position of the items in the context of consumer choice? Isn’t it more
plausible that the pair of stockings was chosen because of its texture than because of its
position? As we saw, Nisbett and Wilson argue that, not having access to the mental
processes responsible for their choices, people offer an explanation of their choices
based on plausibility considerations. Thus, this form of non-clinical confabulation
applies to cases where truth is stranger than fiction:
There is a class of influential factors to which we should be particularly blind.
That class may be described as the mechanics of judgment factors—for example,
serial order effects, position effects, contrast effects, and many types of anchoring
effects. Such factors should seem particularly implausible as reasons for liking or
disliking an object, or for estimating its magnitude on some dimension as high or
low. Indeed, it seems outrageous that such a judgment as one concerning the
quality of a nightgown might be affected by its position in a series (Nisbett and
Wilson 1977, page 252, my emphasis).
4 Confabulating about Moral Judgements and Hiring Decisions
In this section, I will consider two further cases that can be accounted for in terms of an
ill-grounded and inaccurate claim resulting in the adoption of further ill-grounded
beliefs. The examples show that confabulation is not confined to consumer choice,
but can also be detected when people are asked about their moral judgements and their
hiring decisions.
In a study by Jonathan Haidt people are presented with the following scenario:
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France on
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near
the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making
love. At very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that
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night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other (Haidt
2001, page 814).
Participants are asked whether it was wrong for the siblings to make love, and
why. Most people answer that it was wrong for Julie and Mark to make love,
but they struggle to come up with reasons for their judgement. Haidt calls this
phenomenon Bmoral dumbfounding^. When probed, some argue that incest is
likely to have negative psychological consequences for Julie and Mark, ruin
their relationship, and give rise to inbreeding. But the scenario was constructed
in such a way as to rule out these possibilities. We know from the brief
description of the events that Julie and Mark go on to have a good relationship,
and that they use two forms of birth control.
Haidt’s interpretation is that people do not know the psychological mechanisms
responsible for their moral judgements. According to the view he defends, social
intuitionism, what causes people’s moral judgements is a socially conditioned, basic
emotional reaction (i.e., disgust towards incest) to which they have no introspective
access. When people are asked about their moral judgement, they offer a plausible
explanation for rejecting incest as a morally objectionable practice (e.g., that it may
have bad consequences for the people involved). But the claim people offer is ill-
grounded as an explanation of how they formed their judgement and does not fit with
the evidence available to them. In providing an explanation, they commit to claims that
lack support and do not fit the specifics of the scenario, such as BJulie and Mark may
have a baby ,^ or BTheir relationship is likely to suffer .^
Just as the results of the Nisbett and Wilson study, the results of Haidt’s study could
be interpreted differently. For instance, participants may offer an explanation that
involves no confabulation and is based on a false or poorly supported belief (BThe
siblings may have a baby^); or they may offer a justification for their judgement as
opposed to an explanation of it. In the latter case, the reason they offer is epistemically
problematic as a justification of the moral judgement about incest in the specific
scenario because, say, there is no evidence suggesting that Julie and Mark are likely
to have a baby as a result of their sexual encounter.
One could argue that according to some views of moral judgement a practice like
incest can be judged to be morally wrong without further explanation, because it breaks
a rule of moral conduct and needs not be evaluated further on the basis of the
consequences for the people involved. Thus, the objection would go, a dumbfounding
response is not evidence of confabulation but an appropriate response to the request for
explanation. This is a fair point that raises a more general issue: when is it that we
should be able to offer an explanation for our choices and attitudes? That said, there is
additional evidence suggesting that reactions of disgust affect moral judgement without
the person realising it, and such evidence is not vulnerable to the same objection,
because the source of the reaction of disgust is not the human practice to be evaluated,
but the environment in which the judgement is made.
For instance, in the study by Simone Schnall et al. (2008), discussed in some detail
by Strijbos and de Bruin (2015), reactions of disgust caused by elements external to the
scenario to be evaluated (e.g., a bad smell or a dirty desk in the room where the
evaluation is made) increase the severity of the moral judgements. Research partici-
pants are not aware of the effects of the ‘disgusting stimuli’ on their judgements and
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this supports the idea that there are causal factors affecting aspects of attitude formation
that people are not aware of and that they are not likely to acknowledge.
Another context where we observe non-clinical confabulation is that of hiring
decisions. There is copious evidence suggesting that decision makers are biased by
other people’s gender, ethnic background, and sexual preferences in selecting job
candidates based on CVs, and also by people’s appearance (especially weight and
height in relation to gender) in assessing job candidates’ interviews.4 These biases are
often implicit, which means that decision makers may not be aware of all the factors
that impact on their choices.5
For instance, consider the director of a company who has just been involved
in a hiring process. She says that she chose Tim over Arya because Tim was
more confident in his presentation and had more relevant work experience on
his CV. But actually Arya performed as well as Tim, and had just as much
relevant work experience on her CV as Tim did. The director’s choice was
driven by implicit biases against non-white (non-male/overweight) candidates.
In this scenario, the director is not aware of the effects of implicit biases, and
accounts for her choice on the basis of reasons that are not supported by the
evidence at her disposal, such as the quality of the candidates’ performance
during the interview or the relative strengths of their CVs.
The director’s claim can be easily regarded as an instance of confabulation.
When explaining her decision, the director is not aware of some of the factors
causally relevant to it (such as implicit biases), and provides reasons that are
not well supported by the information she has. In the process of providing the
explanation, she endorses other claims that lack evidential support and do not
fit with the evidence made available in the CV and during the interview, such
as BArya is not as confident as Tim^, BTim has more experience than Arya^,
and so on. Just as in the incest case, not knowing which factors causally impact
on her choice, the director offers reasons that are widely accepted as good
reasons for hiring decisions.
The results of experiments on biased hiring decisions could be interpreted
differently. For instance, the director may offer an explanation that involves no
confabulation and is based on a false or poorly supported belief (BTim has
more experience than Arya^). Alternatively, she may offer a justification for her
decision as opposed to an explanation of it, but the reasons she offers are
epistemically problematic as reasons to prefer Tim over Arya because she has
no evidence for Tim being more experienced or more confident than Arya.
I hope I have shown in this section that offering reasons for attitudes and
choices leads to epistemic problems in a number of contexts and not just in
consumer choice; and that confabulation in the sense I am discussing it here
affects the non-clinical population as well as the clinical population with
significant memory impairments. Next, I consider what the costs and benefits
of non-clinical confabulation may be.
4 See for instance: Pingitore et al. (1994), Lieber (2009), Steinpreis et al. (1999), Agerström (2014), and
Agerström and Rooth (2011).
5 See for instance: Holroyd (2012), and Sullivan-Bissett (2015).
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5 Epistemic Costs of Confabulation
We saw that there are some interesting analogies between clinical and non-clinical
confabulation. Table 1 offers a summary of such analogies.
So, what features of an explanation make it an instance of non-clinical confabula-
tion? I believe there are two necessary features and one optional feature that deserve
attention.
Necessary features:
1. Ignorance: People ignore some of the key causal factors leading to the formation of
their attitudes and choices.
2. Ill-groundedness: People produce ill-grounded claims about the causes of their
attitudes and choices.
Common but optional feature:
3. Further ill-groundedness: As a result of producing the ill-grounded causal claim,
people commit to further beliefs that, even if generally plausible, do not fit the
specifics of the situation in which the attitude is formed or the choice is made.
When people confabulate they ignore some of the psychological processes responsible
for the formation of their attitudes or the making of their choices, and produce an ill-
grounded causal claimwhen asked for an explanation. The purpose of the rest of this section
is to clarify what the epistemic costs of confabulation are and how my account relates to
existing accounts of confabulation in the philosophical literature. In Section 5.1. I ask
whether people’s ignorance of the causal history of their attitudes and choices has implica-
tions for self-knowledge intended as mental-state self-attribution. In Section 5.2. I consider
why people offer ill-grounded explanations rather than acknowledging ignorance, and why
they go on and commit themselves to further ill-grounded beliefs.
5.1 Ignorance
The relevant philosophical literature suggests that confabulation is a failure of self-
knowledge. For instance, on the basis of the evidence on pervasive confabulation about
reasons for attitudes and choices, Lawlor (2003) argues that mental-state self-
Table 1 Analogies between clinical and non-clinical confabulation
Clinical confabulation Everyday confabulation
The claim should be based on autobiographical
information that is no longer available due to a
memory impairment.
The explanation of a choice or attitude should be
based on knowledge of factors that are opaque to
introspection (e.g. priming effects, implicit bias).
The person making the claim is sincere and has no
intention to deceive.
The person offering the explanation is sincere and
has no intention to deceive.
The gap in knowledge is filled by a plausible claim. The gap in knowledge is filled by a plausible
explanation.
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attributions lack authority as they are not as accurate as third-party attributions and fail
to correlate with the person’s future behaviour. On similar grounds, Carruthers (2005)
argues that there is no special first-personal route to self-knowledge. His influential
view is that people attribute mental states to themselves in the same way as they
attribute mental states to others, using interpretation.
On the basis that ill-grounded explanations of attitudes and choices are virtually
indistinguishable from well-grounded ones and are very common, Scaife (2014, page
471) argues that we should be genuinely concerned about the reliability of self-
knowledge. Thus, Strijbos and de Bruin (2015) are right in interpreting the standard
philosophical account of confabulation as an instance of Bfailed mind-reading^: con-
fabulation shows that people make mistakes in attributing mental states to themselves.
[If] confabulation turns out to be a widespread phenomenon in everyday social
practice, this would seriously undermine first-person authority of mental state
attribution. (Strijbos and de Bruin 2015, page 298)
Whether the form of non-clinical confabulation we are examining here involves a
failure in mental-state self-attribution depends on what we take successful mental-state
self-attributions to require. In their original paper on priming effects, Nisbett and
Wilson are very clear that participants’ verbal reports are inaccurate because partici-
pants ignore the mental processes leading to their choices and, as a result, misidentify
the reasons for their choices. Confabulation is evidence for the view that people are
blind to the processes responsible for their choices, but does not imply that they are also
blind to what choices they made. Independent of whether research participants can
identify the reasons for their choices, their choices are authentic, in the sense that they
are sincerely reported and genuinely endorsed. If successful mental-state self-attribu-
tions require awareness of one’s attitudes and choices, then they are not threatened by
the form of confabulation reviewed here.6
Does successful mental-state self-attribution require that people are aware of the
mental processes responsible for their attitudes and choices? This sounds like an
implausibly demanding requirement. In the cases where confabulation has been ob-
served and documented (such as consumer choice, moral judgements, and hiring
decisions), causal factors leading to the attitude or the choice are likely to be psycho-
logical processes that involve priming effects, socially conditioned emotional reactions,
and implicit biases whose role cannot be directly experienced or easily observed, but
needs to be inferred on the basis of the systematic, scientific study of human behaviour.
Does successful mental-state self-attribution require that people’s subsequent behav-
iour is explained and reliably predicted on the basis of that self-attribution? This also
sounds like an implausibly demanding requirement, one that imposes more stability
and consistency on people’s mental life than is reasonable to expect. We do not know
whether people who claim to have chosen a pair of stockings for its texture would
choose the softest pair of stockings at their next consumer choice survey, but should
6 Some arguments for the view that the form of confabulation examined in this paper does not threaten mental-
state self-attribution can be found in Bortolotti (2009). One may argue that mental-state self-attribution is
threatened by other forms of confabulation, such as choice blindness. An in-depth analysis of this claim is
outside the scope of the present paper, but it will suffice to say that there are interpretations of the choice
blindness phenomenon which are incompatible with this claim (see for instance Lopes 2014).
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they not do so, the fact that mental-state self-attributions fail to shape their future
behaviour does not speak so much against self-knowledge as against the crystallization
of preference criteria for stockings.
I have proposed here that the evidence of confabulation gathered in the literature on
consumer choice and moral judgements and in the research on implicit biases in hiring
decisions does not threaten self-knowledge as mental-state self-attribution. Research
participants know the content of their attitudes and choices – they just ignore some of
the mental processes contributing to them.
5.2 Ill-Groundedness
We saw that when people confabulate they tell more than they can know, and offer ill-
grounded causal claims as explanations for their attitudes and choices. In addition to
that, people may also end up committing to beliefs that do not fit the specifics of the
situation, as a result of producing ill-grounded causal claims.
It is not clear why people tell more than they can know. Processes of introspection,
self-observation, or self-interpretation are not always reliable methods for identifying
the causal factors responsible for attitudes and choices, and are vulnerable to error. So,
when people are asked questions such as: BWhy did you choose that nightgown?^,
BWhy do you believe that it was wrong for Julie and Mark to have sex?^, or BWhy did
you offer the job to Tim and not to Arya?^, most are not aware of the role of priming
effects, basic emotional reactions, or implicit biases in their choices or attitudes. This is
because such factors cannot be accessed via introspection, straight-forwardly observed,
or inferred from behaviour, and thus cannot be easily identified. But if people do not
know the reasons for their choices and attitudes, why don’t they just acknowledge
ignorance?
People do not acknowledge their ignorance because they do not know that they do
not know some of the key factors contributing to their attitudes and choices. In the
accounts of confabulation developed by Hirsten (2005) and Coltheart and Turner
(2009), people are not dishonest when they confabulate, but sincere, and convinced
of the accuracy of their claims. When discussing the Nisbett and Wilson study,
Coltheart and Turner argue that participants do not realise that they do not know the
answers to the questions they are asked, and they accept as true the answers they
provide (Coltheart and Turner 2009, page 185). This suggests that when people
confabulate they believe they know how their attitudes and choices were formed, and
this is due to the fact that information that would ground accurate explanations for their
attitudes and choices is unavailable to them.
Information can be unavailable to a varying extent and for different reasons
(see Sullivan-Bissett 2015 for details of the taxonomy I use here). We have a
case of strict unavailability when the information that would ground the
accurate explanation cannot be accessed or retrieved. If a person involved in
a consumer survey is asked why she chose a particular pair of nylon stockings
and does not know about priming effects, she lacks the information that would
most likely ground the accurate explanation of her choice.
We have a case of motivational unavailability when there are motivational factors
inhibiting the acceptance or use of the information that grounds the accurate explana-
tion. The director of a company in charge of hiring decisions may become aware of the
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influence of implicit bias on people’s behaviour at an equal opportunities training
workshop. Still, she may refuse to acknowledge that she is implicitly racist or sexist
because this conflicts with her view of herself as an egalitarian. So, she continues to
confabulate reasons for preferring male (non-overweight/white) candidates.
We have a case of explanatory unavailability when information that would
ground the accurate explanation is not regarded as relevant to the target
phenomenon, and thus is dismissed. The fact that people choose items due to
their relative position may seem outrageous (as Nisbett and Wilson say in the
passage I cited earlier), and thus the accurate explanation may be dismissed as
implausible. Similarly, a person who is asked to explain why she believes that
the incestuous relationship between Julie and Mark is wrong might have heard
that people are socially conditioned to react with disgust to descriptions of
incest. Yet, she might find it implausible that moral judgements are primarily
determined by basic emotional reactions of disgust, insisting that her response
was motivated by the endorsement of an ethical principle.
As we saw, when people provide an explanation for their attitudes and
choices, their answers are based on general plausibility considerations about
why stockings are chosen, incest is condemned, or a job candidate is selected.
Because the answers are based on general plausibility considerations, they can
be blind to specific features of the situation at hand. Although it is generally
plausible that softness or brightness makes a pair of stockings preferable to
another, it is false in the context of a choice between identical stockings that
the chosen pair was softer or brighter. In the examples I considered, people
commit to beliefs that do not fit the evidence such as: BThe stockings on the
right are more brightly coloured than those on the left^, BThe siblings will be
scarred by the experience of incest^, or BTim was more confident than Arya^.
Couldn’t people offer an answer that fits the evidence better? People often do offer
answers that are better supported by the evidence. Even if the answer remains an
instance of confabulation, because it is not based on information relevant to the
formation of the attitudes or the making of the choices, the confabulation is obviously
less epistemically costly if it does not also commit the person to adopting further beliefs
that are ill-grounded. Let me offer an example of an explanation that involves no further
commitment to beliefs that do not fit the evidence.
Freya is asked to choose between two nightgowns that are not identical (this was one
of the tasks in the original Nisbett and Wilson study). Let us assume that she chooses
the nightgown on her right-hand side because it is on her right-hand side, but she is not
aware of the role of position effects on her choice. When Freya is asked why she chose
that nightgown she says that she chose it because it is softer. The nightgown she chose
is indeed softer than the alternatives. In this case, Freya provides an inaccurate and ill-
grounded explanation of her choice, as the explanation is not based on information
relevant to why she made the choice. That said, the nightgown on her right-hand side is
softer than the alternatives. Not knowing why she made that choice, and not knowing
that she does not know, Freya provides a plausible explanation that does not commit
her to any additional ill-grounded claims.
Similar scenarios can be constructed in the case of moral judgements or hiring
decisions as well, and this suggests that instances of confabulation can be more or less
epistemically costly depending on whether further ill-grounded beliefs are adopted.
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6 Benefits of Confabulation
In the previous section we saw that people confabulate when they ignore the causal
processes responsible for their attitudes and choices and commit themselves to ill-
grounded beliefs. Given our analysis so far, the prospects for such ill-grounded beliefs
to have any benefits sound grim. However, in the empirical literature on clinical
confabulation two sorts of benefits are discussed: psychological adaptiveness, which
is usually characterised in terms of subjective wellbeing or good functioning; and
biological adaptiveness, which is usually characterised in terms of genetic fitness.7
The two types of benefits do not always come together, as McKay and Dennett (2009)
have observed. A belief or pattern of behaviour can be conducive to genetic fitness by
increasing a person’s chances of survival and reproduction without being conducive to
that person’s increased wellbeing or better psychological functioning, and viceversa.
When we interact with our physical and social environment, there is also an epistemic
dimension to our interactions that does not always receive a distinct acknowledgement
in the psychological literature. That is the dimension I want to explore here. Can
confabulation have epistemic benefits, broadly intended as positive effects on the
acquisition, retention, and use of relevant information?
The empirical literature on dementia and amnesic syndromes suggests that some
forms of confabulation can be psychologically adaptive, enhancing people’s wellbeing
and and also helping people engage more fruitfully in rehabilitation programmes which
improve their chances of recovery or adjustment (Fotopoulou 2008; Hydén and Örulv
2009; Weinstein 1996). One important aspect is that confabulation contributes to
people’s sense of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents, enabling them
to retain and share some key self-related information. An analogous claim can be made
with respect to non-clinical confabulation.
I believe that the role of confabulation in what is often called ‘perceived agency’ or
the ‘agentic self’ has both psychological and epistemic implications, where the poten-
tial epistemic benefits are sometimes mediated by the psychological ones. The person
who sees herself in agentic terms tends to behave more like an agent and this often
leads to better outcomes.
In facing these [life-course] challenges, an agentic individual is the primary origin
of his or her actions, has high aspirations, perseveres in the face of obstacles, sees
more and varied options, learns from failures, has a strong sense of well-being,
and so on. (Little et al. 2006, page 63)
But let us consider how confabulation can make a contribution to perceived agency
first. There are at least three relevant aspects of clinical confabulation that deserve
attention here: (1) the construction of a better self; (2) the integration of self-related
information; (3) the maintenance of the social self.
Confabulating can enhance the person’s wellbeing when the content of the confab-
ulation presents the person in a better light than is the case. For instance, in the
confabulation the person’s independence, talents, or competencies may be exaggerated.
7 Psychological and biological adaptiveness do not exhaust the kinds of benefits that cognitions can have, but
are the most commonly referred to in discussions of confabulation.
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Laura who has dementia claims that she was working in the office this morning but she
was actually being cared for in hospital. Her inaccurate report conjures an image of
herself as healthy, self-sufficient, and industrious. But Laura’s actual situation is very
different: Laura has been retired for some time and she has lost her independence due to
the advanced stage of her debilitating illness.8 Her report makes reference to her pre-
morbid self rather than her current self. When people report a memory that is distorted
because it presents them as more independent, talented, or competent than they actually
are, the distortion often contains some key information about their autobiographical
past, and makes them feel better about themselves supporting the belief that they are
successful in some specific, valued context.9
Further, by confabulating people integrate self-related information into a largely
coherent body of knowledge that helps them make sense of the situation in which they
find themselves. Recall the example of Henry who does not remember all the details of
his married life, but answers questions about it nonetheless, striving to tell a coherent
story. Henry reconciles the fact that he remembers having been married for 4 months
with the fact that he knows he has four children by claiming that his children were
adopted, Instead, he had four children from his wife in over 30 years of marriage.
Although it is false that he had been married for just 4 months and that his children
were adopted, confabulating allows him to impose some coherence on the fragmented
and often conflicting information that he still possesses about himself.10
Related to the previous two aspects, confabulating helps Bestablish and main-
tain a personal identity in interactions with others^ (Hydén and Örulv 2009, page
25). When autobiographical memory is compromised, there are fewer opportuni-
ties to verbalise and share self-related information. People with dementia or
amnesia may feel less confident about social exchanges and fear sanction if
inaccuracies in their reports are detected. When they are assailed by self-doubt
or experience external challenges, they tend to withdraw from social interactions.
Persevering in reporting autobiographical facts is beneficial in this context, even
when reports turn out to be repetitive, distorted, or incomplete, because it enables
people to maintain some exchanges with their peers and consolidate the accurate
information they still have about themselves.
There is some obvious overlap among the three benefits identified in the literature on
clinical confabulation, and all three are primarily psychological: the construction of a
better self leads to greater subjective wellbeing and supports self-esteem at a time when
this is threatened; the integration of self-related information leads to a more coherent
self-image and self-narrative, avoiding the tension caused by conflicting information;
and the maintenance of a social self enables information exchanges and feedback from
peers, reducing the risks of withdrawal and isolation.
Further, the three roles we identified can be said to contribute to people’s sense of
themselves as competent and coherent agents, which is challenged by severe memory
impairments. Arguably the importance of preserving an agentic self is not merely
psychological, and epistemic benefits can also ensue, such as the opportunity to
preserve and share key self-related information (Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett
8 This example is inspired by a case discussed in Hirstein (2009).
9 For an excellent discussion of this point, please see Fotopoulou (2008, page 555).
10 See Moscovitch (1995, page 229) for a description of this aspect of confabulation.
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forthcoming). Despite the loss of autobiographical memory, people who confabulate
continue to exchange information and to see themselves as the experts in the subject-
matter that is their own life. The preservation and consolidation of self-defining beliefs
are epistemic benefits, not mediated by psychological benefits.
Moreover, when people construct a better self they avoid negative feelings of
disorientation and incompetence that could become overwhelming. The successful
management of overwhelming negative emotions has consequences for the capacity
to relate to others, and to interact with the surrounding physical and social environment.
An active engagement with the world is also an epistemic goal, mediated this time by
psychological benefits (such as not being consumed by overwhelming negative emo-
tions). Especially in the context of dementia, confabulation counteracts the negative
effects of social isolation on the capacity to Bexpress and explore identity^ (Bouchard
Ryan et al. 2009, page 145). By filling gaps in knowledge about the past, confabula-
tions support the level of communication required for meaningful social interactions,
helping preserve the capacity and willingness to exchange information with other
people and receive feedback from them (Small et al. 1998, page 291; Hydén and
Örulv 2009; Addis and Tippett 2004). This leads to another epistemic benefit: when
people have the opportunity to share information, they can also be challenged about
what they share, they build more critical distance from their reports, and some of their
inaccurate beliefs become less rigid and less entrenched as a result. Although
socialisation is a psychological benefit, exchanging information and obtaining feedback
are central epistemic goals, whose positive consequences include the acquisition of new
true beliefs and the correction of existing false beliefs.
Can non-clinical confabulation have analogous benefits?
7 Everyday Confabulation and Perceived Agency
The costs and benefits of everyday confabulation are less evident than those of clinical
confabulation, because everyday explanations of attitudes and choices are not re-
sponses to a breakdown, but Bfixes^ to a form of ignorance that can be remedied by
learning about the causal factors responsible for people’s attitudes and choices. That
said, both everyday and clinical confabulations involve ill-grounded beliefs, and both
can play a useful role in supporting a person’s sense of herself as a competent and
largely coherent agent.
As clinical confabulation, so non-clinical confabulation contributes to the construc-
tion of a better self. In the everyday context, people self-enhance by seeing themselves as
competent agents and decision makers who do and believe things for (good) reasons as
opposed to people whose attitudes and choices are randomly determined by external cues
or unconscious drives. When a request for an explanation is made and the accurate
explanation is not available, offering an explanation that is articulate and plausible is
preferable to replying BI don’t know^ from this point of view. Coltheart (2017) argues
that confabulation as a general phenomenon can be seen as an example of the drive for
causal understanding studied byAlisonGopnik (2000). At a mere unconscious level, the
drive motivates people to develop theories for the phenomena they do not yet understand.
Often such theories pick out veridical maps of causal relations among phenomena and
are straight-forwardly adaptive in a biological and epistemic sense, but some of the time
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they get the causal relations wrong. Confabulations are such a case. On the one hand, ill-
grounded explanations can be easily shared and support the person’s sense of herself as a
competent agent and decision maker, that is, someone who can tell what the reasons for
her choices are. On the other hand, ll-groundedexplanations often misidentify the causal
relationships between a person's reason and her choice or attitude.
Non-clinical confabulations can also help identify threads in the person’s attitudes
and choices. Such threads make the person’s overall commitments more meaningful to
herself and others. Recall our previous examples: the company director will see herself
as someone who values self-confidence in her employees and relevant work experience
in job candidates; the person asked to judge a case of incest between siblings will see
herself as someone who morally disapproves of situations that typically cause harm to
the people involved. Thus, non-clinical confabulation can also play the role of inte-
grating self-related information. In spite of being ill-grounded, explanations for atti-
tudes and choices help embed individual attitudes and choices in a more comprehensive
narrative, where reasons form general patterns that the person uses to make sense of her
past behaviour and to predict and even direct her future behaviour. In particular, in the
cases we considered here, confabulation enables a person to integrate an instance of
behaviour whose causes are at least partially mysterious (opaque to introspection or
difficult to infer) into a wider system of beliefs, preferences, and values that contributes
to her overall self-image.
Attitudes and choices are often malleable and unpredictable, and strongly dependent
on contextual cues, as the Nisbett and Wilson study, the Schnall et al. (2008) study, and
many other studies in a variety of research programmes show. However, it is common
for agents to deny fluctuation and impose some stability and coherence on their own
behaviour. Preferences may vary considerably depending on the circumstances, and
this is also due to such preferences being influenced by mental processes that cannot be
controlled via deliberation or accessed via introspection, such as priming effects, basic
emotional reactions, and implicit biases. In spite of this variation, people tend to see
their preferences as stable and consistent across time and across contexts, and maintain
this illusory consistency by confabulating.
The illusion of consistency often leads to better psychological and pragmatic
outcomes than the more accurate acknowledgement of fluctuation. For instance, in
a job search graduates who downplay the inconsistency of their preferences are
more likely to feel good about themselves and their prospects, and to succeed in
obtaining desirable job offers, than those who have a more realistic view of their
own fluctuating preferences (Wells and Iyengar 2005). Thus, one of the benefits of
confabulation is that it enables people to develop threads joining their experiences
together and to present themselves as largely coherent, lowering the anxiety that
comes with self-doubt by over-emphasising integration. This leads to an increased
sense of self-efficacy which serves to sustain the motivation to pursue goals in the
face of difficulties (Bandura 1989).
As with clinical confabulation, also non-clinical confabulation plays an obvious
maintenance of the social self role by enabling information to be shared. Thalia
Wheatley argues that assigning meaning to behaviour helps develop social connections:
B[t]he healthy human brain is not a veridical recorder of events but rather a meaning
machine that fills in gaps, rearranges time and space, delays conscious experience, and
generates false explanations via available cultural theories^ (Wheatley 2009, page 218,
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my emphasis). The view that the brain does not aim at accuracy but at coherence is
often interpreted in a simplistic way, as proposing a straight-forward trade-off between
psychological and epistemic goods, where accuracy is exchanged for whatever is
needed to attain a significant increase in wellbeing or some psychological adjustment.
However, seeing oneself as a competent and largely coherent agent has positive
epistemic consequences.
Ill-grounded explanations for attitudes and choices allow a conversation about those
attitudes and choices to develop, among peers and within oneself, promoting external
feedback or personal reflection on the issues that are relevant to the formation of those
attitudes or the making of those choices. Bertram Malle (2004) argues that when people
confabulate after being asked to explain their behaviour, interpersonal communication
is facilitated. Hugo Mercier (2011) claims that offering arguments to explain judge-
ments or behaviour play an important function especially at group level, where the
argument can be shared, evaluated, and corrected. If the judgement or behaviour were
recognised as something that requires no explanation, or that has been arrived at by a
random process akin to guessing, the person would lose the sense of agency and
efficacy that comes from viewing the attitude or choice as something that reflects her
beliefs, preferences, and values.
In the context of choosing nightgowns and stockings, it may not be so important to
appear as a competent agent and decision maker who is aware of the reasons for her
choices and chooses items for good reasons. However, the implications of an attitude or
choice on perceived agency become more significant when the attempted explanation
concerns moral attitudes or hiring decisions, which the person identifies with and which
can be relied on to shape the person’s future behaviour. Articulating reasons for self-
defining attitudes and choices can be a starting point for dialogue and reflection,
potentially leading to self-criticism and self-improvement.
By contributing to self-enhancement and integration of self-related information and
by playing a social role, everyday confabulation supports people’s perceived agency.
When perceived agency is strong, and people feel that they have the capacity to pursue
and fulfil their goals, then they act more like agents and their motivation is sustained in
critical circumstances. Psychological research has shown that people who self-enhance
are not only more likely to persist in pursuing their goals in the face of set-backs, but, at
least in some domains, they are also more likely to perform satisfactorily and fulfil their
goals. They tend to be more productive, more resilient, better at planning, and more
effective at problem-solving (e.g., Alicke and Sedikides 2009; Hepper and Sedikides
2012). Psychological research on self-efficacy and self-determination have also
established that people who view their attitudes and choices as driven by reasons,
and whose attitudes and choices are integrated in a coherent pattern of behaviour, are
more likely to pursue and fulfil their goals (Bandura 1989; Deci and Ryan 1985).
So far I suggested that a plausible but ill-grounded explanation may be better than no
explanation at all for the purposes of allowing people to share information about their
attitudes and choices, and elicit feedback from others.11 But surely my opponent would
argue that a plausible and well-grounded explanation, including the accurate
11 An utterly implausible explanation may not support social functioning if it makes the person appear
untrustworthy as a source of information.
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explanation, would be far more advantageous, at least from an epistemic point of view.
Well-grounded explanations fare better than ill-grounded ones at representing reality
accurately, by tracking the correct causal relationships, and enabling understanding –
for instance, an understanding of the factors influencing one’s choices. This is a fair
point, and indeed the benefits of non-clinical confabulation I have discussed do not
neutralise its evident epistemic costs.
However, a sophisticated analysis of the epistemic status of confabulation needs to
take into account both costs and benefits. A better-grounded or even accurate expla-
nation, such as the explanation research participants in the Nisbett and Wilson study
may be offering after debriefing (BMy choice of this pair of stockings must be due to
position effects I was not aware of^), is unlikely to play self-enhancing and self-
integrating roles to the same extent as the rival explanation (BI chose this pair of
stocking because it is softer^). Acknowledging that the consumer choice was not based
on the quality of the items but on an unconscious tendency to favour items on the right-
hand side may not support people’s sense that they are competent agents and decision
makers, and may not help them identify patterns that contribute to their construction of
a coherent image of themselves as discerning consumers.
Thus, the confabulation fares worse than the accurate explanation at
representing reality accurately and promoting a well-rounded understanding of
people’s behaviour, but fares better than the accurate explanation at supporting
the person’s perceived agency. Also notice that, in many of the circumstances
we discussed the comparison between offering a well-grounded explanation and
an ill-grounded one is merely a theoretical possibility. This is because the
information relevant to the formation of the attitude or the making of the
choices either is not available, or can only be attained by learning about the
role priming effects, basic emotional reactions, or implicit biases on attitude
formation and decision making. If steps could be taken to make the relevant
information more widely available, thereby enabling people to provide better-
grounded explanations, then the question would be how to preserve some of the
beneficial effects of confabulation. I will come back to this in the next section.
8 Objections and Implications
I argued that ill-grounded explanations for attitudes and choices support peo-
ple’s sense of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents, thereby
sustaining their motivation to pursue their goals, and enable socialisation,
thereby affording the opportunity to reflect and receive feedback on the reasons
for said attitudes and choices. Although I characterised the overall positive
contribution of confabulation as a contribution to perceived agency, some of
the benefits I discussed rest on the opportunity for the attainment of epistemic
goals, such as self-correction and self-improvement, and thus seem to be
distinctly epistemic. In Table 2 I summarise the main benefits of everyday
confabulation, comparing them with those of clinical confabulation.
But the view that confabulations may have epistemic as well as psycholog-
ical benefits raises several concerns, and it is important to think about its
implications.
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(1) Does confabulation really promote socialisation and enable feedback that
would not be forthcoming otherwise?
One concern is that providing misleading information will in time discourage people
from exchanging information with the confabulator and compromise (rather than
promote) socialisation. In other words, the confabulator whose explanations are
recognised as ill-grounded may be socially sanctioned and excluded from future
exchanges, or her contributions to the information exchange may be dismissed as
untrustworthy. This point is particularly relevant in cases of clinical confabulation,
when the report may be evidently false as in the examples of Henry and Laura we
discussed earlier. It is less of a concern in cases of non-clinical confabulation, when the
ill-grounded explanation is often plausible (see Milhailov 2016; Coltheart 2017) and
sometimes feels more intuitively right than the accurate explanation. A key factor here
seems to be whether the confabulation gives rise to further ill-grounded beliefs that can
be more easily exposed as ill-grounded, because the evidence relative to those further
beliefs is likely to be more directly available to the confabulator and her peers. An ill-
grounded explanation in the non-clinical context that does not commit the confabulator
to further ill-grounded beliefs is likely to support rather than undermine socialisation.
Another concern is that providing an answer to the request for explanation may close
off the conversation more than acknowledging ignorance because it gives the false
impression that the confabulator already knows what she is talking about. Wouldn’t a
more open answer such as BI don’t know^ or BI’m not sure^ elicit more constructive
feedback from the agent’s peers? I believe that this depends on what an BI don’t know^
or an BI’m not sure^ answer would be taken to mean. If it were interpreted as: BI think
this question has an answer but I don’t know what the answer is^, then it would be as
conducive to debate as the confabulation, and even more apt at promoting an exchange
of views between the person and her peers. If it were interpreted as something like:
BThis choice has no reason^ or BI chose randomly ,^ then it would seem to close off
further speculation as it would suggest that the choice was entirely out of the agent’s
conscious and deliberative control. Further, notice that an BI don’t know^ or an BI’m
not sure^ answer would not contribute to perceived agency to the same extent as the ill-
grounded explanation, as it would not enable the person to see herself as a competent
decision maker who chooses for good reasons.
Finally, are the benefits discussed in Section 6 and 7 genuinely epistemic? Arguably,
the opportunity to share information and receive feedback is an epistemic gain that is
not mediated by an increase in wellbeing (although socialisation also has independent
Table 2 Summary of the benefits of clinical and everyday confabulation
Clinical confabulation Everyday confabulation
Construction of a more independent,
talented, and competent self.
Perception of oneself as a competent agent who believes and does
things for good reasons.
Integration of self-related information in a
coherent narrative.
Perception of oneself as a largely coherent agent who has a stable
set of beliefs, preferences, and values.
Maintenance of a social self able to share
self-related information.
Participation in exchanges of information, facilitating personal
reflection and peer feedback.
Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation
psychological benefits). When a belief is challenged, the situation can be psycholog-
ically distressing in clinical contexts where the person’s assertiveness and self-esteem
may be already seriously undermined by adverse circumstances. But in the context of
non-clinical confabulation, negative feedback enables people to think further about
their explanation and consider the possibility that it should be revised or rejected (see
Mercier 2011 for a similar point). In addition, the challenge can focus people’s attention
on reasons for the reported choice or attitude that they would not have considered in the
absence of the challenge. Thus, socialisation with its opportunities for exchange of
information and external feedback seems to offer the opportunity to reap some episte-
mic benefits that are independent of the psychological benefits of confabulation.
(2) If the sense of competence and coherence the agent gets from the confabulation
is illusory, how can they have epistemic benefits?
Part of the reason why the philosophical literature has been silent about the
potential epistemic benefits of confabulation is that there is a strong resistance
to accepting the idea that a false or illusory belief can lead to the fulfilment of
epistemic goals. Can we ever get epistemic benefits from a false or illusory
belief? A belief that makes us explore a certain subject matter further may be
inaccurate and still play an important heuristic role, enabling us to gain new
accurate information. One example is the discussion of Buseful fictions^ in the
philosophy of science (e.g., Suárez 2013).
In the present case, if I am right, the tendency to offer ill-grounded explanations
makes people feel and behave more like agents, contributing to attainment of some of
their goals, including their epistemic goals. If people see themselves as agents who
believe and choose for good reasons and are moved by plausible considerations, they
can be more likely in the future to believe and choose for good reasons and be moved
by plausible considerations when they have a more active role to play in the formation
of their attitudes and the making of their choices. This point is well made by Strijbos
and de Bruin (2015) who focus on the future-oriented, mind-shaping aspect of self-
ascriptions.
(3) Why does it matter whether confabulation supports perceived agency or has
epistemic benefits?
Given that ill-grounded explanations for attitudes and choices are epistemically
costly by leading to further ill-grounded beliefs and preventing a fuller understanding
of the reasons for people’s attitudes and choices, measures should be taken to eliminate
or reduce the amount of confabulation in everyday explanations. For instance, one
proposal would be to make information that could ground accurate explanations more
readily available by, say, teaching schoolchildren what the role of priming effects, basic
emotional reactions, and implicit bias can be in attitude formation and decision making.
If it could be demonstrated that this kind of intervention contributes to reducing
confabulation by making the accurate explanations more salient and less ‘implausible’,
then it sounds like it should be implemented. The possibility that confabulation has
some benefits, though, and benefits that better-grounded explanations may lack, sug-
gests that we should also think carefully about what could replace ill-grounded
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explanations in their more positive role, that is, in supporting the sense of oneself as a
competent and largely coherent agent.
One possibility is to devise strategies that can be used to override or compensate
those influences on attitude formation and decision making that do not necessarily
reflect a person’s beliefs, preferences, and values, and that may lead to biased judge-
ments (priming effects, socially conditions basic emotional reactions, implicit biases).
An acknowledgement that people can retain the capacity to vindicate their attitudes and
choices as actively deliberated rather than as largely determined by external cueswould
increase people’s sense of agency and alert them to their general tendency to fill gaps
and confabulate.
9 Conclusions
After describing everyday confabulation and illustrating the phenomenon with some
examples, I proposed that this form of confabulation has two epistemic costs. First, the
main causal claim offered as an explanation is ill-grounded due to ignorance of some of
the causal factors contributing to forming attitudes and making choices. Second,
confabulating may also lead one to commit to further ill-grounded beliefs.
Next, I argued that confabulation has some benefits as well as costs. Given that
typically the accurate explanation is unavailable due to cognitive limitations, motiva-
tional factors, or explanatory constraints, dumbfounding would be the only alternative
to confabulating and would prevent people from making sense of their own behaviour
as motivated by reasons. Ill-grounded explanations fill gaps in knowledge, and, thanks
to their self-enhancing and self-integrating roles, make a contribution to people’s sense
of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents.
As a result, confabulation makes it easier for people to preserve their motivation to pursue
their goals, increasing the chance that they fulfill some of their goals, including their epistemic
goals. Confabulation also enhances socialisation which gives people the opportunity to
verbalise and share both self-related information and reasons for attitudes and choices.
There is no denying that confabulation has epistemic costs. However, in some circum-
stances, the positive contribution of ill-grounded explanations to perceived agency can
translate into epistemic advantages. One is that the explanation can be the starting point for
constructive exchanges with peers and for further reflection on one’s attitudes and choices.
Finally, I considered some implications of the epistemic benefits of confabulation. In
devising measures to reduce everyday confabulation we should also think about how
else to support positive self-construction, successful integration of self-related infor-
mation, and socialisation.
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